History of the 12th Engineers - August 7, 1918
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With the exception of the operation of 20 kilometres of line in the Baccarat district started August 7th, 1918, the operating activities of the 12th Engineers in territory occupied by the American Forces began upon September 1st, 1918, when the light railways in the sector between Luxemburg, Haudainville, and Lempire, were taken over from the French by the First Battalion of the 12th Engineers and operated and maintained under command of the First American Army. The offensive directed toward the reduction of the St. Mihiel salient was impending at this time, and as it appeared that the light railway would play an important part in the operations of the district, it was the desire of the organization to anticipate and efficiently meet as far as possible the requirements of the coming battle conditions. Much work was required and the handicaps to its accomplishment were many. It may be well to first mention the difficulty that was experienced in having the line turned over, with the valuable time lost, before the real work of rehabilitation could be started. The Battalion arrived in the sector sixteen days before the offensive began, yet for five days after our arrival no positive orders were received by the French to turn the line over to us and we were not allowed to start work of any kind, with the result that we found the remaining eleven days before the offensive began, inadequate to meet the requirements of what we deemed to be our very necessary programme. This included the reduction of curvature, the construction of a detour track around a town for the purpose of removing the track from the congested streets, ballasting light track that was without suitable foundation for American power, construction of water points, gun spurs, and side track facilities, intermediate coaling stations and sand driers, installation of control stations, and betterments to the telephone system. We regard the time lost in awaiting the receipt of orders to complete the transfer as having been almost fatal to the efficient use of the light railways during the offensive operations, and the condition was particularly regrettable and flagrant, it seems, in as much as the French had received tentative orders for the turn over, but delayed action until definite orders were received from French Headquarters before effecting a complete transfer. It should be noted that the average French line is really not in condition to effectively meet the demands of American traffic and nearly always requires considerable work to bring it up to our standard. This was the case in the Rattentout Sector. The light rail used by the French must be well ballasted to carry our heavier power, all curves less than a 30 metre radius must be removed, and of prime importance is the necessity, according to our operating methods, for the placement of control stations with sidings at short distances one from the other, with a thoroughly reliable and independent telephone system to them from the Divisional Dispatcher
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With the exception of the operation of 20 kilometres of line in the Baccarat district started August 7th, 1918, the operating activities of the
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[page 2] Operators to communicate their orders to enginemen, with the result that chaos often results. We also found the French method of engine crews stopping to eat or even tieing-up, regardless of the emergency, was difficult if not impossible to change. The light railway operations in the Rattentout Sector suffered also for the lack of proper liaison between the Corps and the light railway Headquarters. There was no Transportation Officer at Corps, to pass on requests for service and decide their precedence; the result was that business was handled in a rather
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[page 3] (6) Many miles of light railways located on the side of main highways, which were crowded with transport at night without lights, resulted in unavoidable accidents, and in future location such condition should be avoided. (7) Excessive curvature and grades on French and enemy lines account difference in equipment make operation difficult. (8) The lines located in the advance area did not go far enough forward to permit the location of dumps at points accessible to limbers and G.S. wagons, as should be the case, thus eliminating further use of motor transport ahead of the light railways. (9) Long delays in loading at railheads due to ineffective methods of issue of rations to units served by light railways, made it impossible to get rations in all cases to destination for distribution the same day that loading was done (10) Absolutely inadequate telephonic communications over system -One of the most vital points of the operating problem. (11) Roundhouse Facilities constructed for light operations not ample to take care of conditions arising with heavy traffic. (12) About 30% French equipment was in use, which required two kinds of repair parts. In addition, due to poorly designed draw bars, this equipment could not be handled without derailment when pushed ahead of engine. (13) Daily derailments of box cars used in ration trains for perishables account of top heavy construction of this equipment. (14) Tractors proved unreliable even with most experienced operators and failed to develop tractive power claimed for them. The 40 H.P. Simplex used by the British should be given a test for service where steam power can not be used. (15) No station signs existed and great difficulty was encountered in placing cars on orders where location was indefinite. Some of the above mentioned conditions were readily corrected, others for obvious reasons were not. The first step taken was the establishment of an organization sufficiently elastic to cover the extensive operating area. The next to install the operating units, and perform the service ordered by the Army, and then attempt to remedy those conditions which seemed to prejudice the effective operation. The attached chart presents the organization, which it will be seen follows closely the divisional system of railroad organization. Close liaison between the operating organization and the Army was maintained through the Superintendent of Car Service of the railways and the Transportation Officer of the Army G 4.
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[page 4] The policy of accepting no orders for service except those coming through G4 was adopted and strictly adhered to. The Transportation Officer of the Army had the authority to decide the precedency of traffic as well as to enforce the proper use of the light railway facilities. His duties included the providing of ample and prompt loading and unloading details and preventing the interference of ill advised Officers in the operating activities. When orders for service were received they were distributed to the operating companies by the Superintendent of Car Service and necessary adjustments in equipment and power made accordingly. To keep in touch with the supply of equipment, a set of car reports with complete instructions relative thereto were prepared (copies) attached). Too much stress can not be laid on this part of the work, for without accurate and complete reports of loaded and empty care, no satisfactory distribution of equipment can be made, nor can movements of loaded commodities be expedited. It will be noted that information was available at all times on the progress of each movement, so that the Transportation Officer at G4 could be advised in the event of delays and necessary corrective measures immediately taken. The District Superintendents controlled the traffic over their respective divisions from their own dispatcher
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[page 5] The problems of the Mechanical Department have been many, and are naturally increasing as the power becomes more and more worn. Due to frequent derailments many spare parts are needed to replace those damaged, as well as the number of replacements necessary as a result of ordinary wear and tear. Our Storekeeper has been able to secure a fair amount of parts, however those most needed were for a time inaccessible due to fact that no spare parts were in France. One mobile shop train of three cars was furnished which has proved very valuable, and in operations where any changes in location of operating companies on short notice are required, it would be advisable to have all shops equipped with such a train. Portable sand driers and pumping stations are also recommended for the Mechanical Department of all operating companies. It is suggested that a definite policy of a weekly washout be adopted, as all engines are subjected to bad water, due to necessity of syphoning water from holes along the line where water tanks are not provided. Too much stress can not be laid to appointment of efficient travelling engineers and firemen, for the operation of the light railway Baldwin is by no means the simple task it would appear. Poor firing results in leaky flues which is perhaps the greatest source of trouble with the Baldwin. A winter and rain protection should be provided for each engine, as the climatic condition render service on engines in bad weather very disagreeable and almost impossible at times. After the signing of the armistice we were advised upon very short notice that we would be called upon to ration the Army of Occupation and that the ration dumps at Conflans and St. Jean would be stocked by light railway from the railheads at Bernecourt and Woinville. Our previous experience in the sector had included the rationing by light railway of units 30 and 40 kilometres from the railhead, but the proposal to increase the distance to 60 to 70 kilometers came as a rather startling suggestion. We prepared to meet the emergency, however, and reconnaissance of enemy lines through maps and otherwise was made and connections to the points mentioned were located. Operating units were made ready, each self contained with all the elements necessary to take station at the allotted place and begin operation. They were placed on cars and on the morning that permission was given to cross the line, they were spotted directly behind the workers of the Maintenance Department, which was forcing connection with the enemy system. Six hours after the ban upon crossing was lifted, the operating units were established at their proper stations in the former enemy country and rations were going forward to Conflans abreast of the advancing column of the Army of Occupation. From this experience we may say that tonnage can be handled over long distances by light railway through interchanging the cars from one division to the other, but at best the practice is uneconomical and to be discouraged excepting in cases of extreme emergency. It felt that the light railways have performed a very useful function in military operations in the present war, especially on a stationary front, for which condition they are best suited. The fact that they can be laid quickly and replaced when damaged without delay makes them available in the areas beyond the range of the normal gauge. They are most useful when highways are inaccessible to trucks due to weather conditions. To fulfil the light railway slogan of the British
Details
| Title | History of the 12th Engineers - August 7, 1918 |
| Creator | Unknown |
| Source | Unknown. History of the 12th Engineers. 7 August 1918. World War I Collection. A1771. Missouri History Museum, St. Louis, Missouri. |
| Description | Brief history of the 12th Engineers which started operating August 7, 1918. In it, the author provided a detailed descriptions of the problems the Unit encountered in preparation for the St. Mihiel Offensive |
| Subject LCSH | United States. Army. 12th Engineers; United States. Army. American Expeditionary Forces; Saint-Mihiel, Battle of, Saint-Mihiel, France, 1918; |
| Subject Local | World War I; WWI; Army of Occupation; Light Railway |
| Site Accession Number | A1771 |
| Contributing Institution | Missouri History Museum |
| Copy Request | Transmission or reproduction of items on these pages beyond those allowed by fair use requires the written permission of the Missouri History Museum: 314-746-4510 |
| Rights | The text and images contained in this collection are intended for research and educational use only. Duplication of any of these images for commercial use without express written consent is expressly prohibited. Contact the Missouri History Museum's Permissions Office at 314-746-4511 to obtain written consent. |
| Date Original | August 7, 1918 |
| Language | English |